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The year 1661 saw the publication of Joseph Glanvill’s The 
Vanity of Dogmatizing, a polemic advocating an intellectual 
break from Aristotle and the Schoolmen in favor of the sort of 
empiricism that eventually came to fruition in the philosophy of 
David Hume. Glanvill was deeply irritated by what he perceived 
as the encrusted academic orthodoxies of his age: “The Disease 
of our Intellectuals,” he railed, “is too great, not to be its own 
[evidence]: And they that feel it not, are not less sick, but 
stupidly so.”3 What was needed was a skeptical cast of mind—
thinkers who would shatter the tiresomely durable scholarly 
categories of the past centuries. The entrenchment of certain 
archetypical ways of knowing had led to the desiccation of 
knowledge and eventually to its distortion. True knowledge, said 
Glanvill, “requires an acuteness and intention to its discovery; 
while verisimility . . . is an obvious sensible on either hand, and 
affords a large and eas[y] field for loose [i]nquiry.”4 
The passing of academic generations often witnesses chal-
lenges to older scholarly categories in favor of the next best 
 
 1. Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.  
 2. Assistant Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law. I am grateful 
to Brian Tamanaha for generous and thoughtful comments. Thanks also to William 
Baude, Brian Bix, Samuel Bray, Rick Garnett, Orin Kerr, Mark Movsesian, Steven 
Smith, Lawrence Solum, and the participants in the St. John’s Law School summer brown 
bag series. 
 3. JOSEPH GLANVILL, THE VANITY OF DOGMATIZING: THE THREE ‘VERSIONS’ 
62 (Stephen Medcalf ed., Harvester Press 1970) (1661). 
 4. Id. at 64. 
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thing. But it is rarer to see the attempted upending of an entire 
way of thinking about a historical phenomenon whose existence 
has achieved unspoken universal assent. In his book, Beyond the 
Formalist-Realist Divide, Brian Tamanaha takes up Glanvill’s 
mantle, and his target is one of the most deep-rooted 
jurisprudential dichotomies of the last century: the concepts of 
legal formalism and legal realism. The book aims “to free us 
from the formalist-realist stranglehold,” an exercise that, it is 
claimed, will allow “us [to] recover a sound understanding of 
judging” (p. 3). 
The book makes three contributions—historical, critical, 
and theoretical. First, it convincingly resuscitates several unjustly 
discredited figures in American legal history. Second, it offers 
various perceptive criticisms of the way in which legal scholars 
and commentators have distorted the views of their predecessors 
for ideological and other ill-gotten gains. Third, it calls for the 
repudiation of the formalist and realist categories in favor of 
what the author touts as “balanced realism” (p. 6), which he 
claims is both an accurate picture of the way that many judges 
always have done and continue to do their work, and a 
normatively attractive jurisprudential account. 
This essay summarizes and praises the historical features of 
the book in Part I. These are the best parts of a very good book. 
In Part II, the essay explores Tamanaha’s interesting critical 
reconstruction, one which attempts to explain why the 
formalist/realist dichotomy achieved such salience in the face of 
copious contrary historical evidence. In the context of assessing 
the author’s critique, the essay expresses some reservations 
about Tamanaha’s appeal to “balanced realism.” In specific, it 
argues that Tamanaha’s ultimate reliance on the very scholarly 
categories that he spends the bulk of his book debunking is 
surprising and somewhat deflating. This recursive move suggests 
that even after all the historical smudge-marks have been 
identified and retouched, the best that can be done is resignation 
to a kind of murky via media somewhere between formalism and 
realism’s grosser excesses. The essay offers two interpretations 
of Tamanaha’s backslide to “balanced realism,” which it calls the 
metaphysical and the historicist interpretations. 
What might all of this mean for legal scholarship? The 
question is too large to be pursued in any detail here, but Part III 
speculates about how adopting the metaphysical and historicist 
modes in legal theory might influence one facet of constitutional 
theory: originalist and living constitutionalist theories of 
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interpretation. It is tentatively suggested that in light of the sorts 
of systematic academic distortions that Tamanaha so adeptly 
documents in the area of jurisprudence, the historicist mode, 
though rarely pursued by legal theorists, offers a more promising 
future for this debate in constitutional theory as well as for the 
formalist/realist question itself. 
I 
The most successful portion of Tamanaha’s illuminating 
study demonstrates that the so-called “legal formalists” of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have been 
consistently caricatured and mis-described (sometimes in bad 
faith) by scholars of later periods. These distortions were often 
absorbed uncritically—as if by rote—into subsequent academic 
treatments of American legal history. Tamanaha uncovers 
evidence that gives shape and texture to the historical portrait of 
the formalists. He vanquishes the myth that they were 
“mechanical” jurisprudes fixated on “finding” the law in some 
sort of nebulous jurisprudential ether, and he shows them to 
have been keenly aware of the realities of indeterminacy, 
subjectivity, law’s non-autonomy as a discipline, and many other 
insights of contemporary legal thought. Long-reviled jurists and 
scholars, including Sir Henry Maine, Thomas Cooley, John 
Dillon, James Carter, Joseph Beale, Christopher Tiedeman, 
William Hammond, and Christopher Columbus Langdell, are 
given well-earned makeovers by Tamanaha’s evidence. They are 
shown to be thinkers in full; no longer robots with cartoonish 
views, but complex and sophisticated minds. 
Conversely, Tamanaha takes legal historians and theorists 
of later periods to task for gross mischaracterizations of their 
predecessors. Jerome Frank, Grant Gilmore, and Roscoe Pound 
come off particularly poorly. Frank is shown to have wantonly 
manipulated the writings of Maine and Beale by carefully 
interposed ellipses and other shoddy academic sleight of hand. 
Where Maine unequivocally asserted that the law was elastic, 
that judges make law, and that few people then believed that the 
law was “a complete, coherent, symmetrical body” (p. 14), Frank 
made it appear that Maine had said precisely the opposite and 
that lawyers in the 20th century continued to believe Maine’s 
fantastic theories (p. 16).5 
 
 5. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). 
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Gilmore’s description of a “Formal Style” of American law 
in the post-Civil War period, in which as a rule people believed 
that “law is a closed, logical system” and that a judges’ role was 
to “discover[] what the true rules of law are and indeed always 
have been”6 is exposed as a fallacy (p. 18). Tamanaha offers an 
abundance of fin-de-siècle articles and statements in which 
lawyers, scholars, and even judges openly acknowledge the 
existence of “judicial legislation,” examples of which include 
passages from arch-“formalist” historical jurists Cooley and 
Dillon (pp. 19–20). In Gilmore’s telling, Benjamin Cardozo was 
the great prophet of the “third age” of American law—legal 
realism—auguring it with his revelation in The Nature of the 
Judicial Process7 that judges “made law instead of merely 
declaring it”; this position, according to Gilmore, “was widely 
regarded as a legal version of hard-core pornography” at the 
time (p. 21). In fact, Tamanaha shows that much of what 
Cardozo wrote about judicial legislation was uncontroversial in 
1921 and had been said repeatedly at least twenty years earlier 
(pp. 21–22), though one should point out there is a difference 
between a well-known and respected judge saying something 
and someone else saying it. It is a pity that Tamanaha devotes 
scant attention (p. 104) to Samuel Williston, a “formalist” giant 
(unlike at least some of the figures Tamanaha resurrects) who 
was also maltreated by Gilmore as a pedantic conceptualist 
technician.8 In his autobiography and elsewhere, Williston acidly 
remarked that the realists’ brash claims to having discovered the 
fact of law’s indeterminacy and their clarion call that judges must 
treat the law as “a means to social ends”9 were old news: “brave 
men lived before Agamemnon.”10 
As for Pound’s influential 1908 article, “Mechanical 
Jurisprudence,” which purported to attack the American 
“jurisprudence of conceptions” in which “everything is reduced 
to simple deduction” from procrustean, “predetermined” legal 
ideas,11 this critique is shown to have been properly directed at a 
foreign theoretical construct—German legal science, and its 
 
 6. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977). 
 7. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).  
 8. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 14 (1974). 
 9. SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW 210–11 (1941) 
 10. Samuel Williston, The Case Method of Studying Law, 43 HARV. L. REV. 972, 
972 (1930) (book review). For a thoughtful treatment of Williston’s intellectual legacy, 
see Mark L. Movsesian, Rediscovering Williston, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207 (2005). 
 11. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 610–12 
(1908). 
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scattered academic partisans (pp. 27–32, 54). Whatever its 
salience among the scholarly set in the United States (and even 
among academics, Pound’s account was hotly contested (pp. 32–
33)), “mechanical jurisprudence” was an exceptionally poor 
description of how most American judges and lawyers thought 
about law and adjudication. 
Even Pound’s constitutional mechanical bête noire—
Lochner v. New York12 (about which, Pound claimed, “rules have 
been deduced that obstruct the way of social progress”13)—was 
interpreted by other leading jurists of the time in exactly the 
opposite fashion: the Lochner majority had been aggressive with 
the facts, substituting its own interpretation for that of the New 
York legislature.14 Lochner instantiated the tyranny of facts, not 
mechanical concepts (p. 36). And Justice Holmes’s celebrated 
dissent in Lochner, in which Holmes famously thundered against 
the constitutionalization of “Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social 
Statics,”15 was in reality a re-run of nearly identical arguments in 
1893 by C.B. Labatt in the American Law Review in response to 
a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision striking down legislation 
prohibiting mine owners from engaging in various abusive 
payment practices (p. 78).16 
Likewise for the doctrine of stare decisis. In Pound’s telling, 
the mechanistic quality of jurisprudence had led to slavish 
obeisance to precedent and the “petrification” of law.17 But 
Tamanaha shows that few, if any, jurists in the formalist era 
believed precedent to be inviolable; not even Blackstone held 
this view, let alone formalist lawyers like Christopher Tiedeman, 
Munroe Smith, or Wilbur Larremore, all of whom plainly 
acknowledged that while precedent had its claims, those must 
always be balanced by competing, “‘irrepressibl[y] conflict[ing]’” 
demands (pp. 38–40). 
In sum, late nineteenth century jurists’ displeasure with 
legal fictions (pp. 48–49), their keenly felt distinction between 
law as ideally conceptualized and law as applied in practice (p. 
54), their fretfulness over the perils of legal uncertainty and the 
 
 12. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 13. Pound, supra note 11, at 616. 
 14. For similar historically sensitive treatment of Lochner, see David Bernstein, 
Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights 
Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 7–12 (2003). 
 15. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 16. The similarities are startling, and Tamanaha suggests that there is strong reason 
to believe that Holmes would have been familiar with Labatt’s article (221–22 n.91).  
 17. Pound, supra note 11, at 606. 
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rapid proliferation of reported decisional law (pp. 33–36, 55), 
their skepticism about mechanical or “deductive” adjudication 
(pp. 49–56), and nothing less than their occasional repudiation of 
“formalism” itself (pp. 45–48)—Tamanaha brings together all of 
these historical theses, supported by evidence from many writers 
of the formalist age, thoroughly debunking the exaggerated 
claims that have been made about it.18 
Tamanaha does similar complicating work for the legal 
realist period. A plain statement of legal realism has always been 
rather difficult to pin down. This elusiveness reflects both 
significant differences among self-described legal realists even 
within the era of their ascendancy and the fact that the realists 
sometimes defined themselves negatively, in response to what 
they perceived as the formalist bogeyman (p. 71). Yet the fact 
that there was no clear-cut manifesto of legal realism does not 
mean that there was nothing distinctive about it; there would be 
few academic movements at all if cast-iron marching orders were 
a requirement. At all events, as an admittedly imprecise 
formulation of legal realism, one that surely would provoke 
particular intramural disagreements, Tamanaha’s working list of 
general characteristics is serviceable: 
 “legal rules can be interpreted in various ways and [] how 
judges interpret the rules will be a function of their 
personal views and the surrounding social forces” (p. 79) 
 “one of the main tasks of lawyers is to predict 
outcomes . . . [which] cannot be done well by attention to 
the rules only” (p. 80) 
 “statutes no less than precedents are open to different 
interpretations, and judges make law in the course of 
applying statutes in particular situations” (p. 80) 
 “judges have broad leeway in connection with stare 
decisis” (p. 81) 
 judges have “substantial freedom” to “select and 
characterize the facts upon which the decision is based” 
(p. 82) 
 
 18. Tamanaha’s evidence is interesting and important, but (as he acknowledges, at 
p. 4) he is not the first theorist to make some of these clarifying claims about the 
formalist era. For a nuanced treatment along similar lines, see ANTHONY J. SEBOK, 
LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 57 (1998).  
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 “judges can regularly find legal support for whatever 
decision they desire, working backward from the result” 
(p. 82) 
 “there are gaps in the law—and in these situations judges 
try to work out the right outcome, making new law in the 
process” (p. 82) 
 “when approaching cases judges typically respond to what 
they perceive as clusters of fact situations or types” (p. 83) 
 “when rendering decisions—interpreting the law, 
precedent, and facts—judges are influenced by 
subconscious factors” (p. 84) 
Tamanaha’s case for debunking even a soft formalist/realist 
divide—that is, one which reflects a transition from formalist to 
realist thought over several decades—is most powerful with 
respect to nineteenth century writers, or at least those who wrote 
primarily, if not exclusively, in the late nineteenth century. As 
one moves closer to the 1920s and 1930s, the appearance of 
realist-sounding statements might be more predictable and 
unremarkable; after all, if legal realism was a distinct school of 
legal thought, it would likely have had some antecedents and 
one would expect to find some evidence of “proto-realism.” It 
would be unrealistic to insist on a hard divide from, say, one year 
to the next: “Realism did not simply come about overnight; its 
evolution was, rather, a hesitant one.”19 
But Tamanaha is alive to this criticism. In each of the nine 
cases of prototypical legal realism listed above, he presents 
evidence that at least one prominent “formalist” writing before 
the year 1900 espoused something very much like the realist 
view (pp. 79–84). One still might observe that the fact that one 
or two, or even a few, nineteenth century writers made state-
ments here and there that were congruous with certain legal 
realist ideas does not indicate anything about either (1) the 
representativeness of such statements in the nineteenth 
century;20 or (2) the degree of commitment of the speakers 
themselves to their realist-sounding statements.21 Taken 
cumulatively, however, Tamanaha’s evidence does a respectable 
 
 19. NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 72 (1995). 
 20. Brian Leiter makes similar acute criticisms about representativeness. See Brian 
Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is The Issue?, 16 LEGAL THEORY 111, 
116–17 (2010) (manuscript at 9–10) (reviewing BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE 
FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE (2010)).  
 21. For example, someone might say something off-the-cuff in a speech or minor 
writing that was in tension with the bulk of his or her other writing. 
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job of rebutting the charge of unrepresentativeness or cherry-
picking. And as for depth of commitment, Tamanaha might 
persuasively respond that he is not out to prove that these earlier 
writers were more authentically or devotedly realist than the 
writers of the ‘20s and ‘30s. He is only interested in showing that 
they were aware of and had themselves expressed similar 
insights about law and adjudication. In this, he succeeds. 
Just as many legal formalists had embraced many realist 
insights, so did many legal realists retain the valuable ideas of 
legal formalism, particularly the necessity and healthfulness of 
legal rules and principles. Walter Wheeler Cook, Karl Llewellyn, 
and Felix Cohen are cited as legal realists who knew the worth of 
legal rules and such “steadying factors” as a legal education 
focused on the authority of doctrine and its development as well 
as the desire of judges to live up to an impartial ideal (pp. 95–
96). Again, Jerome Frank is presented as something of an 
impediment to the recognition that most realists were committed 
to some moderately formalist beliefs. Frank’s contention that 
“the rational element in law is an illusion” and his fixation on 
individual judges’ personalities were not shared by fellow realists 
(pp. 96–97, 115). Yet it is just these extreme positions—ones 
which not even Frank held consistently (p. 98)—which are all-
too-commonly associated with legal realism.22 “A careful 
reading,” writes Tamanaha, “shows that Llewellyn and Frank, 
and the rest of those identified as realists, all along recognized 
the stabilizing and constraining factors in law” (p. 98). These 
were important features of formalist legal theory. 
There is an unaddressed question lurking here about why 
many in the generation succeeding legal realism overtly 
castigated it. Karl Llewellyn, for example, is well known to have 
retreated from legal realism in the post-war years, a view 
culminating in his decidedly anti-realist remarks in The Common 
Law Tradition.23 Tamanaha sometimes relies on this very late 
work (1960) as evidence that Llewellyn always believed in 
something less full-bloodedly realist than what he had written 
earlier (p. 95). But it is not entirely fair to cite a piece thirty 
years after the heyday of a period of thought to show that there 
was “nothing distinctive” (p. 68, emphasis in original) about that 
period; indeed, the language in The Common Law Tradition is at 
 
 22. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 
TEX. L. REV. 267, 269 (1997) (“Even among Realists, of course, Frank’s view represented 
a particular sort of extreme—as Frank himself recognized.”). 
 23. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 3–4 (1960).  
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least equally consistent with the view that legal realism was a 
distinct historical period, features of which later writers (even 
writers who had been realists themselves) attacked and 
rejected.24 Decades earlier, Lon Fuller, no legal realist he, surely 
felt himself to be criticizing something distinctive when he 
objected to the “crusade against ‘conceptualism’” of the 
American legal realist movement,25 even as he recognized that 
“[t]here were, to be sure, premonitions of it as early as the 
beginning of the present century.”26 And again later, it was clear 
enough to Alexander Bickel that he was praising “[t]he realists, 
who were a substantial company of original minds working in a 
time of great ferment,” and simultaneously taking aim at certain 
strains of “arrested [legal] realism or surrealism would be more 
accurate.”27 What were these theorists repenting, commending, 
or reacting against, if not legal realism or some variety of it? 
Lastly, it is not convincing for Tamanaha to point to the 
seemingly serendipitous quality of the arrival of legal realism on 
the scene to support the claim that there was nothing distinctive 
about these writers as a group (pp. 102–03). Much the same 
serendipity attends many historical phenomena whose 
distinctiveness is not in doubt. 
Despite these unresolved questions, Tamanaha’s 
deconstruction of the more extreme claims made on behalf of 
formalism and realism is generally plausible and well 
documented. The evidence that Tamanaha brings to bear is 
substantial and revealing: the received account is problematic on 
a number of fronts and anyone doing future work in this field 
must come to terms with Tamanaha’s historical revision. 
II 
One obvious question is why, given the plentiful evidence 
that Tamanaha marshals, the distorted and exaggerated view of 
formalism and realism has, and continues to have, such staying 
power. Tamanaha offers several explanations for the reasons 
that certain standard modes of theoretical and historical 
 
 24. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 247–50 (1992). In fairness, Tamanaha also 
relies on other earlier work by Llewellyn to raise doubts about his commitment to a more 
thoroughgoing legal realism. 
 25. L.L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 443 (1934). 
 26. Id. at 429. 
 27. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 80–81 (1962). 
!!!DEGIROLAMI-271-VANITYOFDOGMATIZING.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 12/10/2010  10:50 AM 
210 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 27:201 
 
narratives achieve prominence and become entrenched. He 
claims that histories tend to be written as stock narratives, with 
an emphasis on canonical heroes and arch-villains in order to 
lend a certain psychological satisfaction to the account (pp. 200–
01). When the narratives are repeated again and again, 
generation after generation—and when legal academic citation 
protocols reinforce that parroting—the meme becomes not 
merely one narrative among many, but the legal theorist’s idea 
of reality itself. Thus did the distortions of the likes of Frank, 
Gilmore, and Pound achieve authoritative status in later 
generations of legal theory and history. 
Tamanaha also emphasizes the role of political ideology in 
perpetuating the false dichotomy. Progressive scholars in the 
1920s and ’30s used “formalism” to smear whatever socio-
ideological view they opposed. The strategic invocation of 
formalism was rhetorically effective to pump up various political 
and personal agendas. It also had the ideologically salutary effect 
of making their political enemies look retrogressive and passé, 
but it masked important conceptual similarities between 
formalists and realists (pp. 59–63, 84–89). The very same tropes 
were welcomed by legal theorists in the 1970s to give scholarly 
heft and historical continuity to their “seething skepticism” (p. 
61) about the law, all in the service of radical political reform (p. 
200). How much more appealing—how much grander—to claim 
with evident historical warrant that one was reliving an epic 
clash of the titans of American legal theory than to admit that 
one was engaged in local, modestly contingent, ideologically 
motivated policy debates.28 
Likewise, Tamanaha notes the appeal of dichotomous 
historical and theoretical constructions. Clean, tidy, and radically 
opposed pairs of intellectual options are easily digested and 
regurgitated at need. Deep down, legal historians and theorists 
may know well enough, in dark corners that rarely find the light 
of the printed page, that reality is more complicated, but the 
dichotomies are felt to be useful in pointing up basic intellectual 
currents (pp. 120, 201–02). Something like this, Tamanaha 
 
 28. For those who might bridle at the seemingly partisan quality of Tamanaha’s 
anti-Progressive claims, fear not! He restores the balance with some generously anti-
conservative sniping at the politicization of the judicial appointments process: “Ronald 
Reagan was the first president to systematically screen lower court appointees for their 
ideological views. The practice has continued ever since, especially vigorously by 
Republican presidents, at the urging and under close scrutiny of conservative and liberal 
interest groups” (pp. 152–53). 
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argues, explains the binary distortions of attitudinal studies of 
judging, the birth of the field of “judicial politics,” and the 
profound influence of the work of attitudinalist theorists on the 
public’s hunger for easy political explanations of law (pp. 111–
25). Clownish reductions are, in short, helpfully facile; they are 
pragmatically useful for the inter-generational inculcation of the 
gross outlines of academic ideas.29 
This is an interesting and delightfully bleak perspective on 
certain features of the academic enterprise. It is the view that the 
natural—indeed, perhaps the inevitable—tendency of a good 
deal of theoretical scholarship, at least in law, is toward dogma.30 
Legal theorizing, both as a historical and a philosophical 
exercise, moves inexorably toward legal dogmatizing. And the 
movement of legal theory toward legal dogma is catalyzed in 
each generation of scholarship by the political, professional, and 
personal vanities of the theorists themselves. The dogmatization 
of reality—its reduction to simplistic distortions, even sound-
bites (e.g., “mechanical jurisprudence” or “activist judging”)—is 
often the way that knowledge is transmitted most effectively and 
enduringly. 
One might take the view that there is nothing to do or fix 
about this situation; putative fixes are themselves only new 
distortions. But that is not Tamanaha’s approach. There is 
something to do. There is a fix to be had. Because there are 
more and less accurate distortions, they ought to be embraced as 
they approximate the real and discarded as they veer away from 
it. The formalist/realist distortion should be repudiated because 
it “obscures more than it clarifies” (p. 202), while his “balanced 
realism” is enlightening and normatively attractive. 
Balanced realism includes the following propositions; some 
are descriptive while others are both descriptive and normative: 
 judges’ personalities and beliefs will and should influence 
their decisions (what Tamanaha terms “cognitive 
framing”), but this is not the same as “willful judging,” 
which balanced realism condemns (pp. 187–89) 
 
 29. What Tamanaha says about the likely response of attitudinal political scientists 
to his charges bespeaks this view: “Quantitative scholars will defend against these 
criticisms by saying that the attitudinal and strategic models are just simplified 
constructs—they are well aware that judging is more complicated.” (p. 120). 
 30. Tamanaha himself suggests the possibility that theorists who are wedded to 
their academic categories will “dogmatically” reject his evidence. (p. 78) 
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 the purposes and consequences of a rule will and should 
nearly always “have a bearing” on judicial decisions (p. 
189) 
 the law is often uncertain, and when it is, a decision will be 
“essentially contestable” (p. 190) 
 the significance of legally uncertain cases tends to be 
substantial (pp. 190–91) 
 judges are sometimes confronted with what they think are 
“bad rules and bad results,” and their approach to such 
bad rules or results is varied (pp. 191–92) 
 “hard cases” may be divided into cases involving gaps in 
the law and cases involving bad rules or results, but for 
either variety, the potential influence of judges’ personal 
values is enhanced (p. 192) 
 where the law contains an “open provision,” judicial 
decisions will not and should not be made in “rule-like 
fashion” (p. 192) 
 the influence of social factors on adjudication should be 
accepted and embraced (pp. 193–94) 
 judges are not machines and their prejudices will and 
should influence their decisions (p. 194) 
 many areas of law are always “in the making” or “under 
construction” (pp. 195–96) 
 notwithstanding all of the above, judicial decisions are 
often rule-based and the institutional quality of judging 
“helps hammer out a collective product that is 
distinctively legal in a way that transcends” particular 
interests (pp. 194–95) 
As it happens, balanced realism, Tamanaha believes, is an 
accurate description of what most judges in both the formalist 
and realist eras were really up to anyway (pp. 68–69, 90, 125–31, 
186–87), so history itself can be conscripted to “recover” 
balanced realism as a “sound understanding of judging” (p. 3). 
Balanced realism is used to unify the views of very different 
judges and theorists sometimes separated by centuries: Francis 
Lieber, Cooley, Cardozo, Pound, Llewellyn, Richard Posner, 
Antonin Scalia, and even Duncan Kennedy—all of them and 
many more share a commitment to balanced realism in 
adjudication (p. 187). “We are (nearly) all,” Tamanaha seems to 
say, “and we have (generally, in our more reflective moments) 
always been, balanced realists.” 
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It is at this point that Tamanaha is less convincing. First, one 
suspects that any theory of adjudication which is sufficiently 
capacious to accommodate Antonin Scalia, Richard Posner, and 
Duncan Kennedy (to say nothing of all the others) is 
overlooking critical distinctions for the sake of an illusory 
cohesion. True, at some extremely general level, many theorists 
may recognize as a descriptive matter that certain tenets of 
realism and formalism in some way affect adjudication. But 
while stating these tenets may help to pare away some of the 
more dubious and extreme ascriptions that theorists have made 
to formalism and realism over the years (something Tamanaha 
did with great success in the earlier portions of the book), 
Tamanaha has serious normative fish to fry with balanced 
realism. On this front, there is a great deal of room for 
disagreement left within the borders of balanced realism. 
And Tamanaha admits as much: “the general recognition of 
balanced realism . . . will not magically dissolve the many 
differences that now divide jurists in debates over judicial 
decision making” (p. 196). If that is true, then one wonders what 
the payoff of balanced realism is as a normative account of 
adjudication. Justice Scalia and Judge Posner will have radically 
different views about the circumstances in which the purposes 
and consequences of a rule should affect a decision, or whether 
judges ought to embrace the influence of social factors in 
adjudication, or whether many important areas of the law are 
“under construction,” or whether “open provisions” should not 
be interpreted in “rule-like fashion” (vide the unenumerated 
rights of the Constitution), or the extent to which personal 
values ought to influence “hard cases,” and so on. What exactly 
is gained by grouping Scalia and Posner (and so many others 
with their own idiosyncratic and historically contingent views) in 
the same balanced realist basket? Tamanaha gives us little 
justification for balanced realism as a normative theory of 
adjudication. Indeed, because balanced realism is so catholic, it 
is difficult to see how he could. 
Second, and more importantly, one might have expected 
that a book which so assiduously and insightfully illuminates the 
illusions of the theoretical enterprise when it trains its sights on 
history would follow through on those very insights. A book that 
purports to debunk certain scholarly distortions should not 
return to the same dry conceptual well after purporting to drain 
it. It is true that Tamanaha does not explicitly use the term 
“formalism” when he describes balanced realism. At times, 
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Tamanaha advocates discarding formalism altogether as a 
meaningless concept (pp. 159–67), but really what he attacks 
throughout the book are the more implausible features of 
formalism—those which have been used as a club to beat up 
straw men (e.g., “mechanical jurisprudence,” “deductive 
conceptualism”). He is fully in support of a strong sense of strict, 
rule-bound decision making (per the last thesis of balanced 
realism), and he writes favorably of the notion of “fidelity to 
legal texts—constitutions, statutes, and precedents” (p. 178). 
To take one context in which the formalist/realist divide 
might make a difference, John Manning, whom Tamanaha cites 
as a new formalist, has argued that formalism involves the lexical 
privileging of the constitutional structure over other methods of 
constitutional interpretation: “[B]efore testing whether a default 
rule promotes any particular interpretive value, we must first 
ascertain whether the Constitution either enjoins or permits the 
judiciary to recognize such a value as worthy of 
promotion . . . .”31 Anti-formalists might well reject this lexical 
prioritization, and that is a legitimate difference—one which 
survives Tamanaha’s historical clarifications.32 
In fact, Tamanaha overstates his theoretical claims when he 
argues that all meanings of formalism are “empty” (pp. 176–80), 
or that self-described “new formalists” can excise the term 
without any loss. The overstatement is surprising because 
Tamanaha is well-aware of the differences between the new 
formalism and anti-formalism; indeed, he compiles a list of seven 
salient differences, and he says (rightly) that “[w]hen this cluster 
of ideas is taken at the most general level, a broad contrast 
among contemporary jurists can be drawn between those 
identified as formalists and their opponents” (p. 179). Why isn’t 
that enough to preserve the divide? That these new formalists 
and anti-formalists may reject “exaggerated” (p. 179) claims 
does not mean that there are no non-exaggerated differences 
 
 31. John Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 685, 686 (1999); see also id. at 692. An anti-formalist would not give any lexical 
priority to a text where it produced a result contrary to what the anti-formalist believed 
was the overall policy of the legislation; he would adapt the text to its “real” purpose. 
The formalist would reject this approach. See id. at 694–95.  
 32. For reasons which will appear shortly, the neo-formalist example selected here 
is drawn from constitutional law, but there has been at least a mild neo-formalist 
renaissance in contract law as well which in some ways parallels the rise of moderate 
jurisprudential neo-formalism. See, e.g., Mark L. Movsesian, Two Cheers for Freedom of 
Contract, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1529, 1530–31 (2002) (reviewing THE RISE AND FALL OF 
THE FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999)).  
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between them. Likewise, the fact that Tamanaha purports to 
incorporate these various moderate formalist theses into 
balanced realism does not mean that he has stripped formalism 
of any legitimate content. He has simply subsumed it. Perhaps 
Tamanaha still can make the case for junking the term 
“formalism” for pragmatic reasons (e.g., because by this point 
the term itself is confusing, given its history), but this is merely a 
matter of picking names. Conceptually, balanced realism is still 
committed to formalism. 
In light of his ostensible aim to debunk the “formalist-realist 
divide,” Tamanaha’s backslide to “balanced realism” as 
normative prescription—a bit of formalism and a bit of realism, 
in appropriately “balanced” moderation—is confounding. The 
confusion is especially acute because Tamanaha at one point 
says that, like formalism, realism is also “empty of theoretical 
content” (p. 180). But Tamanaha is unlikely to believe that 
realism is empty, or at least as empty as he claims formalism to 
be, since that would reduce “balanced realism” to the rather 
unassuming state of “balanced emptiness.” 
The mystifying backslide to “balanced realism” requires 
some unpacking: it might be interpreted in two very different 
ways. The claim here is not that Tamanaha himself interprets his 
balanced realist project in these terms, but that his appeal to 
balanced realism powerfully reflects one approach to the 
intersection of history and legal theory, while the nature of his 
historical evidence actually might suggest a very different 
approach to that intersection. 
First, the appeal to balanced realism might mean that there 
is at bottom something essentially true about formalism and 
realism—something which, once scrubbed clean of its dubious 
features, is inescapable. If this were so, Tamanaha’s injunction to 
discard or get “beyond the formalist-realist divide” would be 
nothing of the sort. To the contrary, it would be a reaffirmation 
of some hybrid of these shopworn categories as intrinsic to 
theorizing about these issues. The perfect account of law or 
adjudication (or both) would represent some philosophical blend 
of the foundational categories of formalism and realism, and it 
would be up to legal scholars to hunt that elusive beast down. 
Once we accepted that bits of both formalism and realism were 
necessary to construct the ultimate normative theory, it would 
also become clear how much we actually had in common with 
our theoretical antagonists. The scales of academic distortion 
would then be lifted from our eyes, as Tamanaha has lifted them 
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in this book. We can call this the metaphysical interpretation of 
Tamanaha’s appeal to balanced realism. Likewise, we can call 
this general approach to legal theory—one which displays these 
characteristics—the metaphysical mode of legal theory. 
Alternatively, Tamanaha’s balanced realism backslide might 
suggest that Tamanaha has not followed through on the 
implications of his historical evidence. That is, the solution to the 
many deficiencies of legal scholarship that the book identifies is 
not to construct a better distortion (“balanced realism”), and 
continue blindly on the very same trajectory as the vain 
dogmatizers of the past—enlisting history in the service of 
theoretical perfection. The solution is instead to abandon the 
yearning for distortion altogether. One certainly could continue 
to talk about formalism and realism as a loosely related 
hodgepodge of dispositions or moods to which this or that figure, 
today or in the past, shows variable affinity.33 One could describe 
historically inflected varieties of formalism and realism—strains 
of formalism and realism which were particularly influential at 
distinct historical moments in American law—and one could 
praise or condemn a decision in which formalist or realist 
reasoning was used to reach a particular outcome. But one 
would have no grander aspirations for these categories, no vain 
desire to conceive the ultimate normative judicial or legal theory. 
The future for legal theory would lie not in devising still more 
philosophical abstractions of the perfect jurisprudential account, 
but in the careful study of the history of ideas and how various 
theories of law or adjudication affected, or are likely to affect, 
particular legal controversies. We can call this the historicist 
interpretation, and similarly we can call this general approach to 
legal theory the historicist mode. 
III 
The movement of legal theory in either the metaphysical or 
historicist direction might have powerful implications not only 
for the formalist/realist debates but also for scholarship in other 
legal disciplines. Constitutional theory is perhaps an obvious 
example, and it is worth a small excursion to consider how the 
 
 33. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An 
Uneasy Relationship, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 155, 170 (2006) (“As it has developed over 
the years, American legal realism is as much a mood as a set of doctrines.”); DUXBURY, 
supra note 19, at 68 (“Emphasis is placed instead on what can only be described as the 
‘feel’ of realism as an intellectual tendency . . . .”). 
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metaphysical and historicist modes might affect a particularly 
prominent scholarly disagreement: the contest between 
originalism and living constitutionalism.34 
A cursory recapitulation: Originalism is the collective name 
for a cluster of theories of constitutional interpretation all of 
which in different ways rely on historical materials—chiefly 
those that attended the Constitution’s ratification in 1789 and 
the approval of the Fourteenth Amendment in 186835—to 
understand the meaning of the Constitution’s provisions. While 
early originalists were said to champion a variation that 
emphasized the framers’ intentions in enacting the particular 
provision at issue,36 current originalists often (but not always) 
look instead to the original meaning that a particular 
constitutional provision would have had for the founding 
generation. The evidence for such original meaning is broad, 
consisting of everything from the constitutional text itself, to 
canonical documents such as The Federalist Papers, to the 
debates at the Constitutional Convention, to the views of the 
individual state ratifiers, to the ways in which a particular 
locution or turn of phrase might have applied and been 
understood by a hypothetical audience in other constitutional 
provisions or contemporaneous legal contexts, and so on.37 
The major competitor to originalism of whatever variety has 
generally gone under the name of “nonoriginalism”38 or “living 
constitutionalism.”39 An important part of what distinguishes 
 
 34. Tamanaha’s book does not focus on constitutional theory, but I consider it here 
because constitutional theory dominates jurisprudential discussion today. 
 35. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The 
Rise of the Non-Establishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1088 (1995) (arguing that 
it is to the period in which the Establishment Clause was incorporated against the 
states—that is, the mid-19th century—that originalists ought to look to locate its public 
meaning).  
 36. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 145 (1990) (“If the 
Constitution is law, then presumably its meaning, like that of all other law, is the meaning 
the lawmakers were understood to have intended.”). For well-known criticisms of 
original intentions originalism, see Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original 
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original 
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). 
 37. I am bypassing vast oceans of theoretical work on originalism at light speed. 
This is regrettable but it does not particularly affect my speculations about how the 
metaphysical or historicist modes in legal scholarship might impact these issues. 
 38. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: VOLUME 1: 
FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 12 (2006). 
 39. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737 
(2007); Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 353 (2007). I set to the side arguments to distinguish non-originalism from 
living constitutionalism. Mitchell Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 24 
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living constitutionalists from originalists is that the former 
“simply do not privilege history . . . in constitutional 
interpretation. They don’t necessarily sideline text, history, and 
structure; these are just parts of the motley constellation that is 
constitutional interpretation.”40 The dispute between living 
constitutionalists and originalists is too complex to go into in 
great detail, and there is a real question whether it survives the 
ecumenism of the so-called new originalism (more on this 
below). Some former opponents of originalism have recently 
reversed course and become “compatibilist” supporters of the 
new originalism,41 reflecting the degree to which the aspiration to 
constrain judges’ power, which was the centerpiece of paleo-
originalism, bears an uncertain relationship to the new 
originalism.42 Others continue to fly the living constitutionalist 
flag.43 
There is little doubt that originalism has powerful affinities 
with formalism, at least when the subject is the ever-fraught 
terrain of the interpretation of unenumerated rights. And the 
same might be said for the instrumental qualities of legal realism 
and living constitutionalism. Lawrence Solum usefully describes 
the relationship of the former: 
[T]he core of contemporary originalism is the idea that the 
Constitution should be interpreted in light of the original 
public meaning of the constitutional text. That core idea 
appeals to formalists because (as compared with the 
alternatives), it seems to provide a method for reducing 
disagreement about constitutional meaning. To the extent 
that the Supreme Court’s unenumerated rights cases require a 
 
n.52 (2009). 
 40. Leib, supra note 39, at 358. 
 41. Jack Balkin is an example. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original 
Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Abortion]; Jack M. 
Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 
432–36 (2007); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 166 (Ill. Pub. Law 
Research Paper No. 07-24, Nov. 22, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1120244. 
 42. See Kurt T. Lash, Originalism as Jujitsu, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 521, 527 (2009) 
(reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE (2007)) (“Today, most 
originalists have moved away from instrumentalist justifications like ‘judicial restraint,’ 
and instead tend to ground the originalist enterprise on the normative theory of popular 
sovereignty.”).  
 43. See Leib, supra note 39; see also SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE 
PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006). 
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more latitudinarian approach to constitutional interpretation, 
formalists will be suspicious.44 
To say that there is an affinity is not to suggest an identity of 
outlook: one can certainly be an originalist and reject the 
formalist’s respect for horizontal stare decisis, especially if the 
precedent in question used an overtly non-originalist 
methodology to reach its result—if, say, it was insufficiently 
deferential to the relevant constitutional text or history.45 
Nevertheless, the notion that the textual “form” and historical 
“form(ation)” of the Constitution ought to be a constraining 
force on the discretion of judges to decide cases46—rather than 
merely one non-binding factor among many in reaching the best 
outcome—distinguishes originalists from their opponents. 
How might adopting the metaphysical mode in legal theory 
affect the originalist/living constitutionalist debate? That is, 
could we think about originalism and living constitutionalism in 
a way that analogizes from Tamanaha’s reconstruction of and 
normative pitch for balanced realism from the shards of 
formalism and realism as foundational, inevitable categories of 
legal theory? The first stage would be the view that there is, in 
fact, something inescapable in defining our normative 
constitutional possibilities in the dichotomous categories of 
originalism and living constitutionalism. These constitutional 
interpretive outlooks are essential, fundamental, and those 
academics who work in the realm of constitutional theory are 
consigned to join one team and do ideological battle with the 
other. That is simply the way constitutional theory gets done. 
This first stage of the metaphysical mode was reached years 
ago. It is reflected in the decades-long fights about what was 
essentially a political question: originalists were exercised about 
 
 44. Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare 
Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9. U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
155, 163 (2006); see also Paul Horwitz, Judicial Character (and Does It Matter), 26 CONST. 
COMMENT. 97, 102 (2009) (book review) (“In its strongest form, the legalist model is 
often identified with formalist and, in the constitutional field, originalist judges like 
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.”). 
 45. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting 
Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289 (2005). 
 46. Mitchell Berman has described this view as splintering into two possible 
subtypes: the position that original meaning should be the sole object of interpretation; 
and the position that original meaning should be given “lexical priority,” but that other 
meanings can be considered if original meaning does not resolve the issue. Berman, 
supra note 39, at 10. I am doubtful about how many contemporary originalists hold to the 
former view. 
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what they perceived as judicial excesses; living constitutionalists 
celebrated those very same decisions. Because of the political 
nature of the fight and the polarities that it sometimes embraced 
and continues to embrace, it is the kind of debate that can 
capture the public’s political imagination. It can be understood 
by non-specialists and showcased in, say, judicial confirmation 
hearings (Robert Bork’s, for example, and to a lesser degree, 
Elena Kagan’s), where the phrase “judicial philosophy” has now 
become a not very mysterious code for judicial methodology.47 
First-stage originalism may not have many scholarly defenders 
any longer but, as Jamal Green has elegantly shown, it still 
commands the attention and approbation of a significant 
segment of the population, judges included.48 In this first stage, 
the common-sense simplicity of the originalist/living 
constitutionalist divide has an appealing Manichean quality that 
fosters and perpetuates it. It can reach and influence the public’s 
political cerebral cortex49; it is a user-friendly distortion, just in 
the way that formalism and realism (at least pre-Tamanaha) 
have often been. 
The second stage of the metaphysical mode would in one 
sense reflect a moderating touch. It would introduce conceptual 
nuance to support the claim that there is some theoretically 
complex middle road between originalism and living 
constitutionalism which represents the best of all possible 
worlds. The distance between originalism and living 
constitutionalism would thus be narrowed considerably, at least 
for those scholars laboring in the fields of constitutional theory. 
Former enemies could now come together with the aim of 
relocating their disagreements within a single, somewhat murky, 
constitutional interpretive method, in which original meaning 
was consulted and given its due, but because of the 
underdeterminate quality of many constitutional provisions (the 
ones people usually fight about), other interpretive tools would 
be necessary. Those on the outside of the treaty between the 
warring camps would be viewed as recalcitrant fringe figures, or 
 
 47. See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE 
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 98–100 (2007). 
 48. Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 681–82, 690 (2009). 
 49. See id. at 690 (“A second outgrowth of the originalism movement of the 1970s 
and 1980s is increased public attention to constitutional methodology generally and to 
originalism in particular.”); see also Dawn Johnsen, The Progressive Political Power of 
Balkin’s “Original Meaning,” 24 CONST. COMMENT. 417, 418 (2007) (“[O]riginalism’s 
enormous influence has come less as a theory of jurisprudence than as a highly 
persuasive political ideology that inspires passionate political engagement.”). 
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simply people who did not realize that the turbid middle had 
already absorbed whatever was legitimate in their views. After 
all, almost everyone agrees that original meaning ought to figure 
in somewhere in our theories of adjudication, just as nearly 
everyone can agree that the consequences of a rule ought 
somehow to make a difference to a rule’s adoption (p. 189). As 
the approaches began to merge, articles with such titles as 
“Living Originalism” would begin to appear.50 In many ways, we 
have reached the second stage of the metaphysical mode as well. 
We might even re-describe the new, big-tent originalism in 
Tamanaha’s locution—as the arrival of “balanced originalism.” 
Indeed, it may be that Tamanaha’s appeal to balanced realism 
represents just this second stage of the metaphysical mode in the 
formalist/realist debate. 
The third stage of the metaphysical mode would be 
characterized by fragmentation.51 Thomas Colby and Peter Smith 
have ably documented this feature of contemporary originalist 
discourse, but the upshot is that rather than representing 
anything like a single, unified “best” account of constitutional 
interpretation, the middle-way, big tent approach of the new 
originalism invariably resulted in fission. The big tent simply 
could not accommodate all comers. Philosophical sophistication 
begat a kind of hyper-refined scholasticization of originalism, 
spawning the categories of original subjective meaning, original 
objective-public-meaning textualism (which itself fragments into 
Randy Barnett’s “presumption of liberty” variety, Michael 
Perry’s moral reading of the crucial underdeterminate 
provisions, Lawrence Solum’s “semantic originalism,” and likely 
others), original intent (Larry Alexander’s sophisticated version, 
for example), original expected-application, “common law 
originalism,”52 and the “method of text and principle,”53 in which 
“each generation of Americans can seek to persuade each other 
about how the text and its underlying principles should apply to 
 
 50. Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 
(2009). The varieties of originalism that I offer below are drawn from Colby and Smith’s 
article. 
 51. See JONATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 190–205 (2005) (“Much of academic constitutional theory in 
the 1990s was devoted to elaborating, refining, coopting, or attacking originalism. In the 
process, originalism became a more subtle, complex, and fragmented doctrine.”). What 
O’Neill describes as a single movement toward splintering, I think may be better 
characterized as an almost seamless transition from an illusory unity to fragmentation. 
 52. Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 
551 (2006). 
 53. Balkin, Abortion, supra note 41, passim. 
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their circumstances, their problems, their grievances.”54 “[T]here 
are today countless variations of originalism,” explain Colby and 
Smith, “and the differences among them are sometimes so stark 
that it is difficult to treat them as one coherent methodology.”55 
Once the question, “Are we all originalists now?”56 was asked 
and answered affirmatively by a growing chorus of scholars, 
doom was not far off.57 
In one sense, the growing philosophical complexity and 
granularity of originalism was an enormously positive 
development: in the hands of thoughtful and careful scholars, 
originalism was stripped of its dubious rhetorical excesses and 
imbued with theoretical bona fides. But in another sense, it was 
a serious loss. Originalism now became the exclusive province of 
the constitutional theorist; it no longer had any claim on the 
public as a live subject of debate, and it became increasingly 
difficult to implement by judges, at least those who were not 
extremely well-versed in the latest state-of-the-art conceptual 
advances. Steven Smith perceptively observes: 
However the case may be for law generally, though, or for 
philosophy, for originalism exclusion [of non-theorists] has to 
be counted as a cost, I think—and a significant one. After all, 
originalism is supposed to be an approach that actual lawyers 
and judges can employ in deciding actual cases. So if the 
approach becomes so conceptually cumbersome that only a 
theoretical elite can fully understand and participate in it, 
then what good is originalism?58 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Colby & Smith, supra note 50, at 245. 
 56. See, e.g., James E. Fleming, The Balkanization of Originalism, 67 MD. L. REV. 
10 (2007), (noting the prevalence of the question, though inclining toward a negative 
answer); Seth Barrett Tillman & Steven G. Calabresi, Debate, The Great Divorce: The 
Current Understanding of the Separation of Powers and the Original Meaning of the 
Incompatibility Clause, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 134, 135 (2008), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/GreatDivorce.pdf (Tillman, Opening State-
ment) (“If there was any doubt before, there can be no doubt now, post-Heller, we are all 
originalists now—at least those of us who wish to remain relevant and within the 
mainstream of our ever-evolving judicial culture.”); Sanford Levinson, The Limited 
Relevance of Originalism in the Actual Performance of Legal Roles, 19 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 495, 496 (1996) (“[W]e are all originalists.”).  
 57. See Jamal Greene et al., Profiling Originalism 1 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law 
& Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 10-232, 2010) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1567702 (“Hands have been wrung, 
voices raised, and much ink spilled over the question of whether, to paraphrase Jefferson, 
we are all now originalists.”).  
 58. Steven D. Smith, That Old-Time Originalism 9 (Univ. San Diego Sch. Law, 
Research Paper No. 08-028, June 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1150447. 
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Something analogous might be said for Tamanaha’s use of the 
psychologically abstruse notion of “cognitive framing” to explain 
the real import of the influence of judicial personality on 
adjudication (pp. 187–89).59 If we are interested in “balanced 
realism” as a normative theory of adjudication—one which we 
hope can at least to some extent guide and constrain judges—
then much depends, Tamanaha says, on whether a judge’s 
subconscious inclinations lead her to (benign) “framing” or 
(malign) “willful judging” (pp. 187–88). But since these two 
modes of adjudication often “can shade into one another” 
(p. 188), it seems that we will need to subject our judge to an 
extensive battery of training in cutting-edge psychological 
research (or psychotherapy?) and cognition theory in order to 
stand a chance of distinguishing between the two.60 Otherwise, 
only the experts will be able to tell the difference. 
Be that as it may—and because my aim here is really to 
consider legal scholarship and not adjudication—the run-away 
quality of originalism’s ecumenism would elicit efforts to delimit 
it, to cabin and pin down originalism’s core claims; to “strong” 
views, for example, that bear a resemblance to the position held 
in the first stage (but which few scholars now hold61), and which 
could then be debunked.62 But even that descriptive core would 
be disputed by other theorists with their own originalist core 
commitments.63 The eventual result would be that the big tent 
would be torn asunder and while the label “originalism” would 
continue to be plausibly assigned to any of its constituent 
theories, there would cease to be any unifying normative vision 
 
 59. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris 
and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009) (arguing that 
courts should take steps to cleanse their decisions of “cognitive biases” using the 
techniques of social psychology). 
 60. It is unlikely that a judge’s “sincerity” can bear the weight that Tamanaha 
demands of it in distinguishing between “framing” and “willfulness.” The distinction 
between framing and willfulness can be quite fine and self-delusion might well obliterate 
it. 
 61. Even original expected-application theorists such as John McGinnis and 
Michael Rappaport do not claim that the original expected applications of the 
constitutional text should be the exclusive interpretive target; they are simply non-
exclusive evidence of original meaning. See John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, 
Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 
379 (2007). 
 62. Berman, supra note 39, at 18–20 (“Originalism proper is strong originalism—the 
thesis that original meaning is the only proper target of judicial constitutional interpretation or 
that it has at least lexical priority over any other candidate meanings . . . .”). 
 63. See, e.g., the attempt by Solum to defend a core of originalism in what he calls 
the “semantic content” of the Constitution. Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and 
Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409, 411 (2009). 
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for originalism. Constitutional theorists would tend to their 
respective normative vineyards, each of them developing their 
own “best” accounts of originalism, each of them claiming that 
something like their own version ought to control, and each of 
them enlisting history to serve their purposes and “empower” 
their socio-political allies.64 In this way, the fundamental 
categories of originalism and living constitutionalism would be 
fixed in amber as a subject of speculative academic study and 
contestation.65 If we have not reached the third stage yet, we are 
not too far from it. 
It is not my intention in the least to disparage this way of 
proceeding. There is value in continuing to parse and distinguish, 
to slice finer and more elegant cuts of originalism, to claim 
theoretical and political preeminence for each as they come and 
go, and to enlist history as an aid in shoring up those prescriptive 
claims. This is the way that many non-originalist theories of 
constitutional interpretation have been developed and 
championed—perhaps the arch-example being Ronald 
Dworkin’s “right answer” approach and its use of legal history as 
the handmaid of theory.66 There is no question that as a result 
our normative theories of the Constitution have become more 
philosophically rich. 
But I do want at least to suggest—not an alternative, 
exactly, but another course for legal scholarship, one which I will 
call a historicist possibility.67 This is not the place to offer a fully 
 
 64. Dawn Johnsen conjectures giddily about the “progressive political power” that 
Jack Balkin’s origino-revisionist interpretation of Roe v. Wade might portend. Johnsen, 
supra note 49, at 418 (“Progressives will benefit from Abortion and Original Meaning 
. . . . As they read, they will feel their spirits soar and at times will silently (perhaps 
audibly) cheer.”).  
 65. See O’NEILL, supra note 51, at 204–05 (“Although these recent developments 
add nuance and sophistication to originalism, they also bespeak a certain fragmentation 
and diffusion of the originalist project into possibly incompatible versions. Careful 
historical recovery and philosophical grounding of originalism are more complicated and 
perhaps more divisive tasks than the critique that particular decisions or doctrines of the 
Warren and Burger Courts bore little readily discernible relationship to the original 
meaning of the Constitution.”). 
 66. See RONALD M. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 279–90 (1977). 
 67. The eminent historian of philosophy Frederick Beiser has cautioned that 
anyone who uses the term “historicism” “enters an intellectual minefield.” Frederick 
Beiser, Historicism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY 155, 
174 (Brian Leiter & Michael Rosen eds., 2007). One of the many dangers, Beiser writes, 
is that historicism: 
has acquired opposing meanings because it has been used to refer to 
diametrically opposed views of history. According to one view, the purpose of 
history is to know the general laws or ends of history; its aim is to find the 
system or unity behind the chaos of the past. According to the other view, the 
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developed theory of historicism in constitutional theory, and 
only some sketchy outlines will be presented here. The key 
difference is that the approach to legal scholarship in the 
historicist mode would require that we forsake the aspiration to 
devise the ultimate constitutional interpretive theory. The 
historicist theorist would recognize that a wide variety of 
theories of constitutional interpretation exist, each with its 
advantages and drawbacks. He would be sensitive to the ways in 
which these competing theories had been used in the past to 
ground and justify certain outcomes. He could describe 
originalism and living constitutionalism as an agglomeration of 
loosely-related dispositions or moods (rather than hard-edged 
normative programs), composed of numerous strands of 
sometimes incompatible arguments, to which this or that figure 
might more or less closely adhere. And he would analyze how 
these rivals, or some combination of them, might be used by 
courts to decide future cases. 
Admittedly, taking up the historicist mode might well entail 
a bit less normative constitutional theory than is now 
fashionable, at least of a certain kind. This is something of a 
virtue, though it is not often regarded as such by constitutional 
theorists. It is the virtue of stopping short,68 of withholding final 
normative judgment about the lessons of history. It is the 
conscious decision not to write “Part III” of the law review 
article, in which the problems of history are resolved decisively 
with the neat and tidy coup de grace represented by the “unified 
theory.” The virtue of stopping short is characterized by 
prescriptive and methodological reserve—not disinterest, but a 
distinctly conservative reticence—in the face of historical 
complication. 
When constitutional theory confronts constitutional history, 
the historicist mode is well-suited to interpreting past legal 
conflicts and historical figures with particular attention to the 
social concerns and problems out of which they grew. This is not 
to say that legal history with an explicitly metaphysical 
 
purpose of history is to know the individual, to plumb the depths of the unique 
and the singular, through exacting detailed research; it rejects the possibility of 
discovering general laws or ends of history. 
Id. In using the term “historicism” here, I do not mean to appeal directly to the 
philosophical program in nineteenth century German philosophy that Beiser describes. I 
am not expert in that literature and it would be anachronistic and intellectually 
presumptuous to attach myself to that rich philosophical school. Nevertheless, it is fair to 
say that I intend something much closer to the latter meaning of historicism.  
 68. I owe this way of putting it to Samuel Bray. 
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orientation—that is, an orientation which proceeds by way of 
apology, attempting to explain historical events as fitting or not 
fitting a particular premeditated theoretical construct—cannot 
be careful, edifying, and exceptionally well done.69 Indeed, most 
historical inquiry proceeds along the lines of explaining events 
by recourse to some organizing meta-principle or idea, and there 
is no reason at all to exclude originalism and living 
constitutionalism from the range of possible organizing concepts. 
The point is merely that it might be refreshing to see more 
work by constitutional theorists whose very purpose for being 
was not to justify or condemn a particular legal event according 
to originalist or living constitutionalist premises. Such efforts 
would not work backwards from history strategically to reach 
the authors’ own brand of originalism or living 
constitutionalism—with the result that one could conscript 
history to buttress the perfect theory of the Constitution. History 
would not be used to justify or condemn contemporary theories 
of interpretation, or as an instrument to “bash” theoretical rivals 
in the contest for methodological supremacy.70 
For example, Professor Balkin’s originalist apology for Roe 
v. Wade is as deft and clever a revisionist account as one is likely 
to see, one which he intends as a weapon to pierce his now 
intramural methodological rivals. Balkin’s originalist 
reconstruction of Roe is meant explicitly to serve the “larger 
purpose of . . . demonstrat[ing] why the debate between 
originalism and living constitutionalism rests on a false 
dichotomy.”71 Using the originalism of the “method of text and 
principle,” Balkin is able to recharacterize what scores of 
scholars have deemed the poster-child of living constitutionalist 
adjudication as actually, truly, originalist, assuming that 
originalism is understood aright. Yet it ought to surprise no one 
that Balkin’s originalist opponents (those who subscribe to very 
different originalist premises) would parry his thrust with the 
claim that the “method of text and principle” originalism—which 
embraces the power of social movements as agents of change in 
 
 69. Michael McConnell’s reconstruction of Brown v. Board of Education along 
originalist lines, for example, is a remarkable achievement and a model of careful 
historical scholarship in the metaphysical mode. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and 
the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995). 
 70. Mark A. Graber, Desperately Ducking Slavery: Dred Scott and Contemporary 
Constitutional Theory, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 272 (1997) (“Each school of 
contemporary constitutional thought claims Dred Scott embarrasses rival theories.”). 
 71. Balkin, Abortion, supra note 41, at 292. 
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constitutional meaning—could be used just as effectively to 
justify Lochner v. New York: 
We cannot help but also point out that Balkin’s method of 
interpreting the text in light of meaning that social 
movements bestow on it may well justify Lochner as well as 
Roe. The free labor movement that began in the mid-
nineteenth century suggested that the right to contract was an 
essential liberty.72 
It is something of a surprise, however, that one of the most 
brilliant and distinctly historicist treatments of Lochner was 
written by none other than Balkin himself just a few years before 
his piece on abortion.73 Indeed, Balkin’s historical analysis of the 
way in which Lochner has regularly been used strategically by 
successive generations of legal academics to condemn or praise 
contemporary legal theories to which those scholars had pledged 
allegiance (e.g., the claim by John Hart Ely that Roe represented 
illegitimate “Lochnering,” and contrary claims with mirror-
image motivations a generation later) embodies a deeply 
historicist ethic74: “Political agitation and social movement 
activism, followed by successful elections and judicial 
appointments change constitutional common sense,” and in the 
process, “both critics and defenders found new uses for 
Lochner.”75 
Balkin concludes that if Lochner was wrongly decided, “it 
will not be for any of the reasons that we law professors 
continually offer for why it was wrongly decided,” but because 
the judges who actually decided it did not make the fullest use of 
“the tools of understanding that their legal culture offered 
them.”76 This claim matches up nicely with Tamanaha’s evidence 
about the way in which Lochner was generally received (pace 
Pound) as a piece of legal craft when it was decided. And what is 
true for Lochner should be true for Roe: that is, historical 
treatments of Roe by constitutional theorists should not be the 
exclusive province of interpretive methodologists with 
contemporary normative axes to grind. 
One advantage of adopting the historicist mode might be 
that it would allow those constitutional theorists who approach 
 
 72. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 61, at 380 n.13. 
 73. Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional 
Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677 (2005). 
 74. Id. at 688–92. 
 75. Id. at 702–03. 
 76. Id. at 725. 
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historical events and figures to confront them more forthrightly, 
particularly when those histories represent dark points in 
American history. Owning up to the painful truth that the 
Constitution has been enlisted by what were likely well-meaning 
and committed theorists and judges to support political and 
social programs that are widely deemed moral failures is useful 
for a clear-eyed and realistic view to the problem of the 
possibility of constitutional evil, in the past and today.77 
A quite different but perhaps even more important benefit 
would be distinctly normative: historicism leads to the possibility 
of acknowledging the costs of methodological commitment. For 
any given approach to constitutional interpretation is attended 
by gain and loss, and crowning any single theory king masks the 
degree to which the loss and sacrifice of values represents a 
pervasive feature of constitutional law.78  Even worse than this—
methodological fidelity sometimes demands the commitment to 
making real sacrifice appear either unimportant or a positive 
good. 
Taking the historicist mode would permit a more nuanced 
view of historical events, and it would entail the belief that there 
likely exists a legitimate and reasonably broad range of plausible 
outcomes in any given case: not just “off the wall” or undeniably 
correct but a gray zone of legitimacy in between, using a variety 
of historically contingent interpretive approaches.79 As time 
passes, the plausible range of interpretive possibilities may shift, 
but this is not to say that the range is infinite or even ever-
expanding. It will always be controlled—by the tether of 
doctrinal and social history.80 
“Constitutional theory—both normative and positive,” 
Michael Klarman once wrote, would “benefit from a substantial 
dose of historicism.”81 This is especially true whenever 
 
 77. Mark Graber has developed similar arguments against both originalist and 
“perfectionist” constitutional theories. MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE 
PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006). 
 78. For more on this issue, as well as the development of a particular style of 
historicism in constitutional interpretation, see Marc O. DeGirolami, Tragic Historicism: 
A Theory of Religious Liberty (on file with author). 
 79. Balkin, supra note 73, at 717. 
 80. On the former, see Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis, and the 
Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 277–82 (2005) (arguing that if 
we were really interested in judicial restraint, we would favor a strong theory of 
precedential constraint far more than originalism, because the norms of precedent are 
“thicker,” the raw materials of precedent far more accessible, and the style of reasoning 
much more familiar to lawyers and judges). 
 81. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A 
!!!DEGIROLAMI-271-VANITYOFDOGMATIZING.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 12/10/2010  10:50 AM 
2010] BOOK REVIEWS 229 
 
constitutional theory engages (as it always must) with 
constitutional history. 
*** 
The contrast between the metaphysical and historicist 
modes of legal scholarship leads us directly back to Brian 
Tamanaha’s book. Can we turn the analogy to constitutional 
theory back onto his formalist/realist divide? If the analogy is 
persuasive, there is reason to think that Tamanaha has embraced 
the metaphysical mode: he is chasing down an ideal theory, and 
he is conscripting history to shore up his arguments for balanced 
realism. But as sophisticated and inclusive a theory as balanced 
realism may be, it is unlikely to win the prize he seeks for it, at 
least for any fixed term. Indeed, and ironically, the nature of the 
historical evidence that Tamanaha uncovers and the pungency of 
his criticisms of the legal theoretical enterprise when it sets its 
sights on history are themselves tacit, but powerful, arguments 
for historicism in scholarly discussion of the formalist/realist 
divide. That would manifest the virtue of stopping short. 
Yet it is well to conclude with praise. These reservations 
about the balanced realism prescription should not be read to 
detract in any way from the genuine achievements of this book. 
In it, Brian Tamanaha shows himself to be a fair-minded 
scholar—intellectually, a straight shooter. The book that he has 
produced—careful, devastating in its criticisms, eye-opening in 
the evidence that it uncovers—is an authentic reflection of those 
admirable qualities and is well worth reading by anyone with an 
interest in jurisprudence and American legal history. It is, in all, 
a credit to an institution all too often bedeviled and beguiled by 
the vicious charms of vanity. 
 
 
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1935 (1995).  
